With a market capitalisation of over $AUD1.84 trillion dollars and large annual flows, the superannuation guarantee has been regarded as the backbone of Australia's retirement policy scheme and a primary driver of economic growth.
Introduction
In most developed countries, common symptoms underlying social disequilibrium, such as ageing populations, a decreasing birth rate, limited tax revenue, disagreement on raising taxes -not to mention the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC), have placed considerable pressure on welfare systems (Castillo 2012) . Australia, with its weak working population growth and increased longevity, is no exception. Treasury (2010) highlights the burden of an ageing population on health, age-related pensions and aged care expenditures. This implies that more tax revenues have to be allocated to fund Australian social benefits for pensioners, specifically their living costs, medical expenses and other services needed for the elderly. The success of Australian retirement policies can be measured by the reduction of these gaps over time; however, these trends have the potential to threaten quality of life for Australian retirees. Like many other developed countries, Australia will have to make critical decisions concerning matters such as the continuing reduction of social security benefits due to government funding constraints, measures to increase productivity, and an increase in retirement ages. These policies may lessen the impact, but they are not the panacea (Treasury 2014).
For most Australians, retirement incomes are a combination of their personal savings throughout their working life, superannuation savings and/or a full or part-rate age pension (Rothman 2007) . Some choose to use their retirement savings to pay off their home mortgage, while others use their savings primarily for retirement income.
Nevertheless, the Government has modified both the superannuation system and taxation to encourage Australians to maximise their retirement income via mandatory superannuation funds and voluntary contributions.
Superannuation may have long existed in Australia but it has only become widespread thanks to the introduction of Superannuation Guarantee (SG) in 1992 (Nielson and Harris 2010) . Since the SG, Australia's superannuation industry has more than tripled in value (from approximately $AUD480 billion in 1992 to $AUD1.84 trillion in March 2014), thus exceeding Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These figures confirm that superannuation has become a prominent investment vehicle for Australian households. Government policy changes such as pre-tax salary sacrifice, after-tax personal and/or spouse contributions, and the introduction of 'MySuper' have mostly been welcomed. However, the debate on inadequacies such as gender inequality, excessive fund management fees and a lack of superannuation investment awareness/financial literacy continues (Rothman 2007; Warren 2008 ). This paper is motivated by recognition of the growing economic and social importance of superannuation, which is no longer simply a minor element of private retirement savings but has become a vital component of the Australian economy. Our paper reviews and integrates literature concerning the role and benefits of superannuation, main characteristics of the superannuation industry, superannuation plans on offer, and the MySuper initiative. In so doing, we identify relevant risks and perceived inadequacies of the superannuation system and its recent changes. 1 We conclude the paper with recommendations for further empirical research, especially the need to gain a better understanding of gender inequality, superannuation funds' disclosure and fee structures, operational and investment performance of passive and active investment strategies, financial literacy and member awareness of relevant products and services.
The role of superannuation in the Australian economy Australia's retirement provision system is comprised of the age pension, the mandatory and fully funded superannuation guarantee scheme, and other long-term private savings such as voluntary contributions and property, fixed-income and stock market investments. This three-pillar system has been developed over time, not only to address the challenge of funding an ageing population, but also to solve a range of broader political, social and economic issues.
While the burden of age pension benefits grows heavy on the Government's budgetary obligations, superannuation 2 has asserted itself as a viable policy alternative to help maintain the lifestyles of older Australians in retirement. In the first half of the twentieth century, superannuation was confined to select groups of employees, such as public servants and high level staff in large corporations such as banks (APRA 2007) .
However, in the early 1980s, Australia's level of state involvement in retirement savings policy increased and superannuation became the preferred approach to deal with the issues of an ageing workforce. Nevertheless, Borowski and Olsberg (2007) show that only 45% of the Australian working population were protected by superannuation during this time. Of this 45%, 77% were male and 23% female, and largely employed in the public service sectors. The superannuation scheme that covered these workers came in different types but was mainly of a defined benefit nature.
Further, due to the lack of preservation age and generous tax concessions, the scheme transformed from income supplementation for retired workers to a special form of severance payment with lesser taxable income (Borowski and Olsberg 2007) .
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a significant focus on addressing concerns of inequity associated with parochial superannuation coverage in the workforce. As a result of the 1986 National Wage Case, which gave a 3% employer superannuation contribution in lieu of wage rises, superannuation coverage rose to over 79% of the workforce (Nielson and Harris 2010) . Further, there was a significant increase of superannuation coverage in the private sector workforce from 32% in 1987 to 68% in 1991. However, this 3% contribution was too small to deliver major improvement in workers' circumstances, except those of high-income earners -not to mention the onethird of private sector workers left uncovered by the award (APRA 2007).
Recognising the long-term significance of retirement savings, a regulatory framework called the Occupational Superannuation Standard Act 1987 (Cth) (OSS Act) was introduced in 1987 (Nielson and Harris 2010) . The OSS Act set standard guidelines with which superannuation fund providers needed to comply in order to be eligible for tax deductions and to perform their duties as trustees in general law.
However, the only punishment for non-compliance was to remove the tax concession status from superannuation funds (APRA 2007) . The OSS Act 3 was later replaced by the Superannuation Industry Supervision Act 1993 (Cth) (SIS Act) after the introduction of the SG was proposed by the Keating Government in 1992.
The SG brought employer-funded superannuation beyond the limits of award coverage and required an employer tax deductable contribution of 3% for each 3 The OSS Act remains the key legislation to deal with the eligibility of concessional tax treatment (Pearson 2009 ).
employee into a regulated fund (Pearson 2009) , with the proportion being progressively raised over time. For example, from 1 July 2014, the SG requires employers to contribute a minimum of 9.25% on top of their employees' wages into nominated superannuation accounts, with this rate expected to increase gradually to 12% by 2025 (Australian Taxation Office 2014d).
In order to be eligible for the SG, employees must not: (1) earn less than $AUD450 per month; or (2) be aged 70 or over; or (3) be aged under 18 years of age and work less than 30 hours a week; or (4) perform domestic work for non-business employers for less than 30 hours a week (Jefferson and Preston 2005) . For employers, a failure to comply with the mandatory contribution would become the basis for a nondeductable SG charge, which requires employers to pay the equivalent of the individual employees' shortfall in contribution, interest and an administrative charge.
The success of SG has led to high growth (i.e., from 48.1% in 1989 to 89.9% in 2012) in the coverage of superannuation for both full-time and part-time workers (Keegan et al. 2013 ). This has resulted in Australia gaining one of the highest private pension coverage rates in the world (OECD 2013a:91) . It also highlights the positive effects of a gradual increase of mandatory rate and superannuation coverage in encouraging higher retirement savings.
Despite these successes, the ongoing Government's commitment to gradually increase the SG rate to 12% by 2025 might not be enough to provide Australian retirees with a reasonable living standard. Minifie (2014) In acknowledgement of this dilemma, the voluntary superannuation contributions scheme was introduced in 1993. The scheme enables eligible taxpayers to boost their retirement savings through tax deductions via concessional (pre-tax) and nonconcessional (post-tax) contributions. Instead of being taxed at the marginal rate, concessional contributions get taxed at 15%, whereas non-concessional contributions are made after the deduction of personal income tax (Australian Taxation Office 2014a; 2014b). These voluntary schemes are widely used as a tax minimisation strategy (particularly by moderate-to high-income earners 7 ) to achieve higher savings for retirement at the expense of reduced Government tax receipts (Feng 2014; Ingles 2009 (Brown et al. 2002; Gruen and Wong 2010; Parrish and Delpachitra 2012) . Such issues can be prevented, to a certain extent, by 'forced' compliance associated with superannuation saving.
The second main reason the SG plays a stabilising role in the Australian economy is that superannuation reduces reliance on the Government's age pension scheme. This then allows the Government to allocate their resources to other policies and programs (Bateman 2002) . A third main reason for the SG stabilising role is that significant expansion of superannuation assets generates financial liquidity. This then boosts Australia's local economy through the stock market, banking sector and infrastructure development (Inderst 2014) .
When evaluating the characteristics of the superannuation industry, it would be inadequate if one fails to consider its long-term investment performance. Long (2010) observes that the annual compounded net return of Australian superannuation funds between 1997 and 2009 was 3.04%, which was only just above the inflation rate (2.8%) and lower than bank term deposits (4.5%) and the All Ordinaries stock market index Consequently, the big four now own approximately 55% of retail superannuation fund assets, allowing the banks to generate profits from management fees and also from sales of superannuation products (RBA 2014) . There is also a considerable number of superannuation funds (mostly not-for-profit funds) outsourcing their management tasks, including asset management and custody, financial advice and insurance to external fund providers like banking groups (Donald et al. 2013 ). In line with this development, services to self-managed super funds (SMSFs) have proven to be a lucrative market, drawing increased attention from the banks (RBA 2014).
The traditional functions of the banking sector -borrowing and lending -also do not escape from the scope of influence of superannuation. About 15% of bank funds now flow from superannuation. In turn, Australian banks hold 25% of assets purchased through superannuation, particularly bank deposits. RBA (2014) indicates that there is a significantly higher rate of allocation in bank deposits by superannuation funds as compared to other OECD countries over the last decade. It is reasoned that superannuation funds have made certain changes to their allocation policies by emphasising conservative investments, such as bank deposits, as a way of reducing fund exposure to stock market volatility following the GFC (RBA 2014).
The role of the superannuation industry in financing infrastructure projects 11 has also received extensive consideration in recent times (RBA 2014) . The continuing improvement of infrastructure is of great importance to the Australian economy, as it enables more effective utility of production processes. Therefore, cost-effective investment will increase economic output as a reflection of higher capital generation and labour productivity (Industry Super Australia 2014). Discussion by the G20 on how to resolve fiscal constraints faced by Governments in funding for infrastructure, suggest alternative sources like superannuation. There is no accurate figure on the allocation toward infrastructure assets by Australian superannuation funds but it is expected to be between 5% and 6%, on average, in 2013 (Inderst 2014) . This translates into a dollar value of approximately $AUD70 billion to $AUD85 billion of total superannuation investments (Inderst and Raffaele 2013) .
Overall, Australia's SG in not just tackling age benefits but also fuelling capital market investment and becoming the benchmark for OECD countries. Most OECD members are struggling to sustain their public expenditures, unlike Australia, which has adopted both public and private funding systems to finance age pension benefits. The estimated OECD average of public expenditure on age benefits 12 was 7.8% of GDP, while Australia only spent less than 4% of GDP in 2012 (OECD 2013b) . This demonstrates the relative success of Australia's retirement provision scheme in resolving the issues of an ageing population; thus, reducing the financial burden on the (e.g., schools, hospitals, infrastructure, etc).
Superannuation plans
Superannuation contributions are allocated into two main superannuation plans: (1) defined benefit (DB); and (2) DB is designed based on the assumption that retirees, on average, live until 80 years of age (Bodie et al. 1988) . Arguably, any increase to Australians' life expectancy will become a major threat to the financial viability of DB plans over time. This implies that DB fund members could bear the risk of administrative and investment costs which end up being greater than the benefits received. The government would also bear this risk, as DB fund members would have to fall back on the pension to cover any shortfall in retirement savings. Further, DB plans do not offer much flexibility when it comes to employment termination and portability. As discussed in Bodie et al. (1988) Finally, self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) are small, tailor-designed funds with a maximum of five members, all of whom must be trustees of the fund.
Contributions can be made to SMSFs from trustees within the fund, self-employed businesses, and/or those employed by their own company. SMSFs are growing rapidly due to greater flexibility in investment choice, tax advantages and use of leverage (i.e., instalment warrants and property investments) (APRA 2005). Table 1 illustrates specific details of the superannuation funds mentioned above.
Notably, superannuation assets total $AUD1.62 trillion. By June 2013, SMSFs and retail funds had become the first and second largest funds, respectively, accounting for 57% of the total assets under management. It is also noted that SMSFs have grown at an impressive rate, increasing from less than $AUD280 billion in 2004 to over $AUD508 billion in June 2014. On the other hand, most corporate funds have outsourced their investment management to retail funds over time (Chant et al. 2014 ).
[Insert Table 1 Regardless of the fact that superannuation is the backbone of Australia's social policy scheme, Cooper (2010a) notes that the management of superannuation funds have been almost privatised and there is no national default fund operated by the Government.
Therefore, this could explain some of the issues encountered with 'default options', such as the lack of accountability, comparability and transparency within the system, inadequate accounting and financial disclosure and the high level of management fees and charges incurred across the Australian superannuation industry (Cooper 2010a (Cooper , 2010b .
By recognising the limitation of default options, a cost effective product called Regulatory structure
Most DC members are offered investment choices at the commencement of their employment; however, the vast majority choose to disengage (Warren 2008; Gallery, Newton and Palm 2011) . Consequently, such superannuation accounts are placed in default options (Iskra 2012) . This disengagement by new members could be due to system complexity, members' lack of financial literacy (Cooper 2010a ) and/or employees' perception of default options having their employers' endorsement (Beshears et al. 2009 ). As such, the MySuper initiative offers a number of features designed to assist members who do not wish to engage in their superannuation investments and prefer to be part of a large, 'diversified' superannuation fund.
MySuper's characteristics, as described by Cooper (2010a) , are specific requirements for trustees to: (1) deliver low cost outcome for members; (2) These arrangements will provide full benefits of MySuper to all default option members, while allowing time for industry to process the transition. It should be noted, however, that existing members' accounts related to defined benefit schemes or certain other legacy products are not affected by these changes. Second, in relation to investment strategies, products can be offered as either a diversified balanced or lifecycle option. No age restrictions are placed on members who wish to select a lifecycle strategy. Also, lifecycle strategies can be varied across four different age groups.
Third, MySuper fund providers must deliver a single diversified balanced option with a standardised set of fees, whereas lifecycle product fees can be priced differently across four age groups. Further, funds have the freedom to offer a discounted administration fee to corporate plans that are negotiated on behalf of employees. For instance, tailored MySuper products (which may have different fees, member services and investment strategies) are allowed to be offered to employers with more than 500 employees. However, details of such tailored products and discount administration fees must be reported to APRA and also made available to the public. In an examination of the strategic asset allocation of MySuper products, the survey of Chant et al. (2014:8) shows that most MySuper providers allocate over 70%
of their portfolios to growth assets, which is consistent with Weaver's (2005) (Chant et al. 2014 ).
In addition to passive and active management of funds, research shows that the allocation of assets within the portfolio is also important. For example, there is evidence to suggest that balanced portfolios, which tend to have only a moderate allocation to equities, may not be optimal. Sy and Liu's (2009) Poterba et al. (2006) find that, at modest risk aversion, the expected utility of a 100%
allocation to an equities investment allocation strategy tends to be much higher compared to conservative strategies. Basu and Drew (2010) further explain that a high allocation to equities offers better promise for investors in achieving their target retirement savings. This is because equity investments have historically outperformed fixed income securities over longer time periods. They also explain that a high concentration in equity investments is actually less risky on most occasions if risk and return are calculated over longer time periods.
Another option associated with MySuper is called 'lifecycle' investing. Lifecycle investing provides trustees with more flexibility in allocating members into different investment mixes based on age (Productivity Commission 2012). A lifecycle approach aims to reduce sequencing risks, particularly concerning the possibility that members may suffer a great loss in their savings when it matters most (i.e., near retirement) (Chant et al. 2014 ). An underpinning assumption is that members become more riskaverse with respect to their investment performance as retirement approaches.
Therefore, lifecycle strategies focus heavily on growth assets when members are young but then shift to more conservative assets as they approach retirement age (and for whom wish to preserve their capital). Although lifecycle options may deliver lower expected returns in comparison with balanced options, it provides potential for lower effective fees when viewed on an asset-weighted basis.
The implementation of the lifecycle option falls into two different categories, namely member switching and cohort funds (Mercer 2014:4 Despite the increasing economic significance of superannuation due to the gradual increase of mandatory contribution rates, the system has not avoided scrutiny.
The compulsory superannuation system has been criticised by researchers (Agnew, Bateman and Thorp 2013; Bateman 2003; Bateman et al. 2012; Borowski 2009; Chardin 2011; Gallery et al. 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011, 2013; Samy et al. 2008) for its ignorance of those in less advantaged labour market positions. The benefits of superannuation funds are yet to reach many financially vulnerable and illiterate groups because of their limited capacity or unwillingness to engage and comprehend system complexity. 17 As a result, the vast majority of superannuation members are being allocated into default investment options such as the MySuper initiative. This implies that fund managers will be responsible for generating investment strategies and portfolios which meet the diverse objectives and risk tolerances of many superannuation investors. Further, with the management of funds being shifted to trustees or fund providers, fund managers will increasingly play a vital role in investment outcomes, including the future retirement benefits of their members. This also infers that superannuation members will be exposed to greater risks; for example, market inefficiencies, principal-agent problems, high superannuation fees, and political/regulatory instability.
Although the Government has attempted to address these issues by introducing a simple, cost effective and diversified product such as MySuper, the effectiveness of this reform remains controversial. MySuper not only reflects the Australian Government's ongoing development of the superannuation system but also limitations of the system as a whole. The new regulatory environment aims to provide a general blueprint for APRA regulated funds to comply with, specifically disclosure of financial information 17 Arguably, the system has served higher-income earners well in terms of taxation benefits received, while those on lower-incomes have found it difficult to accumulate adequate retirement savings.
and performance standards. However, there is no standardisation in constructing
MySuper investment strategies. Each superfund provider still exhibits a diverse and wide range of investment options, while gender inequality and members' low financial literacy and disengagement remains neglected.
The need for a better understanding of the Australian superannuation system is apparent, as empirical evidence does not currently support a thorough understanding of the issues raised in this paper. In order to gain a better understanding of the Australian superannuation system, empirical investigations could be carried out on gender inequality, superannuation funds disclosure and fee structures, operational and investment performance of passive and active investment strategies, financial literacy, and member awareness of relevant products and services. The importance of such research is clearly underpinned by the size and scope of the Australian superannuation industry ($AUD1.84 trillion -the 4th largest system in the world and greater than national GDP). With so much at stake, failure to grasp the complexities of the evolving retirement system will clearly have long-term ramifications for the Australian economy and, more importantly, its people. 
